Written by Kajal Chaturvedi
This article aims to question the classical Marxist theory of the State in post-colonial societies, focusing on the historical specifics and structural changes caused by colonial experiences. The role of the military bureaucratic oligarchy becomes a common phenomenon in these societies, and it needs to be analyzed in the context of the alignment of interests among the indigenous bourgeoisie, neo-colonialist bourgeoisies, and landed classes under Metropolitan patronage. The focus is on raising new questions that pertain to post-colonial societies.
CLASSICAL MARXIST THEORY
The focus on the role of bureaucracy and the military in post-colonial societies raises crucial questions, especially concerning classical Marxist theories. According to Miliband, Marx’s primary view sees the State as a committee managing the bourgeoisie’s common affairs and as an instrument of one class oppressing another. However, there is a secondary view of the State in Marx’s work, where it’s seen as independent and dominant, arising from his analysis of the Bonapartist State.
In post-colonial societies, the relationship between the State and the economic structure is more complex than in previous examples. The colonial experience and subsequent realignments have made this relationship intricate. In Western societies, the nation-state developed as indigenous bourgeoisies gained power, fostering capitalist relations of production.
In colonial societies, the process was different, as the establishment of a bourgeois state by the metropolitan bourgeoisie came with the imposition of colonial rule. The colonial state had a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus to exercise dominion over the indigenous social classes.
Upon independence, weak indigenous bourgeoisies inherited this overdeveloped state apparatus, leading to bureaucratic controls that maintain and extend the dominant power of those at the top of the state hierarchy.
THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM
The central problem with the state in post-colonial societies arises from its establishment by a foreign imperialist bourgeoisie, which ends its direct command at independence but maintains significant influence. The post-colonial state’s class basis becomes complex, with both the neo-colonial bourgeoisie and indigenous bourgeoisie holding power and competing interests. The state acts relatively autonomously, mediating between the interests of these propertied classes while preserving the social order based on private property and capitalist mode of production.
In post-colonial societies, the state’s role differs from classical bourgeois states due to its multi-class nature. The military-bureaucratic oligarchies play a new and relatively autonomous economic role, directly appropriating a significant portion of the economic surplus for bureaucratically directed economic activities in the name of development. This sets the post-colonial state apart from the classical Marxist theory.
In democratically functioning governments, politicians and political parties are part of the state apparatus, occupying complex roles. They are expected to represent and realize the demands of their supporters while also shaping public opinion to align with policies set by those in power. Their relationship with the bureaucratic-military oligarchy is both competitive and complementary, especially when politicians can influence the careers of individuals in the bureaucracy or military.
THE MANTLE OF LEGITIMACY
In post-colonial societies, various power-sharing arrangements exist between political leadership and bureaucratic-military oligarchies. While political parties initially hold legitimacy and political power after national independence, there is often a gradual weakening of their power and a corresponding increase in the influence of bureaucratic-military oligarchies, leading to their overt “seizure” of power. Tensions and accommodations between political leadership and the oligarchies are common.
Political parties serve a purpose for bureaucratic-military oligarchies by providing political legitimacy, absorbing public discontent, and channeling grievances through democratic processes. However, the essential issue is the relative autonomy of the state apparatus and its mediatory role between the competing interests of different propertied classes.
In capitalist post-colonial societies like India, the ruling Congress Party does not represent a single class but rather mediates between competing propertied classes alongside the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy enjoys a significant level of autonomy, despite the apparent power of politicians.
The relationships between bureaucratic-military oligarchies and politicians in India and Pakistan have evolved over time, starting from their opposition during the freedom struggle to a new relationship of mutual accommodation after independence. The bureaucracy’s strength lies in extensive administrative controls and its direction of numerous public agencies engaged in various activities. The proliferation of bureaucratic controls and routine interactions between the public and bureaucracy strengthens the bureaucracy’s position, with politicians sometimes acting as brokers for official favors.
INDONESIA AND PAKISTAN
The evolution of relationships between political leaders and bureaucratic-military oligarchies in post-colonial societies varies based on historical backgrounds and political forces. In Indonesia, it took time for the bureaucratic-military oligarchy to consolidate power after Sukarno’s overthrow due to the need for radical restructuring. In Indonesia and Pakistan, powerful bureaucratic and military structures were inherited, but their interactions differed.
In Pakistan, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy has held effective state power since the country’s inception. Initially, politicians provided a facade of parliamentary government but were manipulated by the oligarchy.
Later, politicians were used again in a system of “Basic Democracy” under Ayub Khan. Challenges to the oligarchy’s authority came from political movements demanding regional autonomy and a fair share of resources and power for underprivileged regions. The dominance of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy and the regional basis of challenges form two aspects of Pakistan’s political reality.
Until 1958, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in Pakistan influenced the rise and fall of governments and even established the Republic Party in 1956. Ayub Khan introduced a new constitution in 1962 and manipulated politicians to maintain a facade of political government. The oligarchy prefers to rule through politicians as long as their autonomy and power are not threatened. The 1970 elections in Pakistan had disconcerting results, leading to the 1971 crisis and the secession of Bangladesh.
BHUTTO AND THE ARMY
After the defeat of the Pakistan army in Bangladesh, President Bhutto assumed power during a moment of crisis. The bureaucratic-military oligarchy needed a political leader to manage the explosive situation, and Bhutto’s position and indispensability granted him some freedom. However, his dismissal of certain generals shouldn’t be seen as a final defeat of the oligarchy, as Bhutto was closely allied to powerful factions within it.
When Bhutto took power, he dismissed General Yahya Khan and appointed General Gul Hassan as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Army. However, General Gul Hassan belonged to a powerful faction within the military establishment, and he was already considered a likely successor to President Ayub Khan before the political agitation in 1968. With Ayub Khan’s resignation and Yahya Khan’s rise to power, events turned a full circle.
Despite Bhutto’s role in the crisis, the critical struggle for power remained within the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. This became evident when Bhutto had to dismiss General Gul Hassan and replace him with General Tikka Khan, a leader of the ‘hawks’ in the army who had orchestrated the military action in Bangladesh. While the appointment was politically unpalatable for Bhutto, it demonstrated the decisive supremacy of the army Junta in the country’s power dynamics.
BIG BUSINESSES AND THE GENERALS
In the military, factions are formed based on personal alliances, but underlying structural factors also play a role in shaping broader alliances. One can distinguish “Conservative Right Wing” Generals who either come from wealthy landed families or have amassed substantial fortunes through business, sometimes in collusion with foreign powers. Big businessmen in Pakistan have awarded profitable directorships to retiring Generals, strengthening their relationships with army factions. The army’s ability to have direct dealings with foreign powers independently of the government is a remarkable feature of the political situation in Pakistan.
There is another influence in the army that promotes radicalism, predominantly of the ultra right-wing variety. This radicalism stems from the recruitment of soldiers and junior officers from impoverished agricultural regions like the unirrigated areas of Rawalpindi Division and parts of the NWFP. These men have strong social grievances due to their economic hardships, but their political education is limited, often subscribing to a conspiracy theory of society. Their solution to problems often involves punitive actions against perceived wrongdoers.
Politically, these men have been influenced by extreme right-wing chauvinism and religious ideologies, with the Jamaat-e-Islami having considerable sway over them. However, in recent years, the radical rhetoric of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party has also gained traction among them, solidifying Bhutto’s political position within the army’s rank and file.
HAWKS AND THE OBJECTIVE BASIS
There are Generals in the army who have strong connections with the rank and file soldiers, forming the group known as “army generals” with a focus on the interests of the army above all else. This group includes the “hawks” in the army, who thrive on chauvinism to demand more national resources for a larger and better-equipped army.
The military balance in South Asia has shifted due to India’s re-armament and re-organization, making the old policy of confrontation with India no longer credible. The superpowers, USA and the USSR, have tried to encourage a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, but the oligarchy has resisted due to its interests in maintaining the status quo and relative autonomy.
Both the bureaucracy and the military in Pakistan are powerful compared to their indigenous class bases. Capitalist development has taken place under their control, leading to restricted business opportunities for a privileged few with ties to the bureaucracy. While the business community influences public affairs through direct contact with the bureaucracy, it lacks a political party that genuinely represents their interests as a class.
LANDOWNING AND PARTY POLITICS
In parliamentary democracy, landowners hold significant power and dominate party politics, especially in rural areas. They are elected to national and provincial legislatures, and even in regions without large landowners, influential “Sardari lineages” control local votes. The bureaucracy and the army also draw their senior officers from rich rural families, further solidifying the position of landowning classes within the oligarchy.
The link between the bureaucracy and landowners has been strengthened by the grant of land to civilian and military officers, making them substantial landowners themselves. This has allowed the landowning classes to protect their interests effectively, resisting attempts to subject agricultural incomes to income tax and receiving large subsidies that primarily benefit wealthy farmers and big landlords.
However, while landowners have a dominant role in parties and close links with the bureaucracy, they do not have complete control over it. There have been instances where the interests of landowners as a class have been subordinated to those of the bourgeoisie, particularly in policies favoring business magnates who own textile mills over the landowners’ interests in raw cotton prices.
FOREIGN BUSINESS AND OLIGARCHY
Foreign businessmen, like others, seek bureaucratic favors and often succeed in obtaining them. They face competition not only from indigenous business interests but also from various competing metropolitan bourgeoisies. None of these foreign interests, however, has complete control over the bureaucracy or collectively commands it. The relative autonomy of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in post-colonial societies makes it open to the intrusion of neo-colonialist interests in shaping public policy.
Western ideologues place great emphasis on the bureaucracy as an “agent of modernization” and endeavor to influence it ideologically in favor of policies that align with metropolitan interests. This is achieved through training, international agencies, and aid administration that channel policies to suit the interests of foreign countries, even if those policies go against the interests of the post-colonial nation.
In Pakistan’s case, the state apparatus is not exclusively commanded by any single propertied class—the indigenous bourgeoisie, the neo-colonialist metropolitan bourgeoisies, or the landowning classes. The power and influence of each class are offset by the others, and the bureaucratic-military oligarchy mediates between their competing demands. This unique role of the military and bureaucracy in post-colonial societies stems from the fact that none of the propertied classes exclusively dominates the state apparatus, granting the bureaucratic-military oligarchy a relatively autonomous role.
A DISTINCT RELATIVE AUTONOMY
The concept of “relative autonomy” can be understood in two senses within Marxist literature. The first sense refers to the idea that elements of the superstructure, such as the state, are not mechanistically determined by the underlying economic structure, but are influenced in a complex way. The second sense pertains to a theory explaining the relationship between the state and the underlying structure in specific historical situations.
Classical Marxism discussed the relative autonomy of the superstructure within the framework of a society dominated by a single ruling class, typically the bourgeoisie. However, in post-colonial societies, the issue is fundamentally different, as it involves three distinct propertied classes with competing class interests. This means that the phenomenon of relative autonomy in post-colonial societies is of a different order compared to historical cases on which classical Marxist state theory is based.
In post-colonial societies, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy’s role is relatively autonomous because no single class has exclusive command over it after the colonial power’s control is lifted at the moment of independence. This relative autonomy is further supported by the state’s extensive interventions in the post-colonial economies, which include controls embedded with the vested interests of the bureaucracy and direct appropriation of a significant portion of the economic surplus.
These interventions in the economy, along with imperialist influences through economic and military aid administration, play a crucial role in shaping the relative autonomy of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in post-colonial societies.
MEDIATING THREE INTERESTS
In post-colonial societies, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy plays a mediating role between the competing demands of the three propertied classes. Unlike other historical circumstances, the mutual relations between these classes in post-colonial societies are not antagonistic and contradictory, but rather mutually competing yet reconcilable. In colonial situations, classical Marxist theory envisions a coalition between the metropolitan bourgeoisie, native ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie, and the ‘feudal’ landowning class, with the rising native ‘national’ bourgeoisie seen as opposing the metropolitan bourgeoisie.
However, in post-colonial societies, the political unity of the propertied classes is possible because of fundamental differences in their underlying structural alignments. The completion of the task of winning national independence and the establishment of a nation-state framework already accomplished by the metropolitan bourgeoisie enable an accommodation between the native bourgeoisie and the ‘feudal’ landowning class. The latter complements the political objectives of the native bourgeoisie in running the post-colonial state, as it plays a crucial role in establishing links between the national-level state and local-level power structures in rural areas it dominates.
This dynamic allows the ‘feudal’ landowning class to contain potentially revolutionary forces and help maintain the political equilibrium in the post-colonial system. As a result, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy’s relative autonomy is established within this complex interplay of competing yet reconcilable interests among the three propertied classes in post-colonial societies.
THE GREEN REVOLUTION
In post-colonial societies, the relationship between the native bourgeoisie and the ‘feudal’ landowning classes differs from the classical Marxist theory, as the native bourgeoisie no longer seeks to eliminate the landowners for capitalist development. Instead, a mutual accommodation has emerged between them, facilitated by the ‘Green Revolution’ and the elite farmer strategy, which has increased the agricultural surplus needed for industrialization and urbanization. While some pressures for radical land reforms existed after independence, they were generally ineffective, and the focus shifted towards mutual accommodation.
The growth of socially ‘disruptive’ forces due to the elite farmer strategy in rural areas may contribute to revolutionary movements, causing concern for the bourgeoisie. They seek to consolidate a conservative alliance with the landowning classes to preserve the existing social order rather than supporting forces seeking to overthrow landowners’ power in rural areas.
Regarding the relationship between metropolitan bourgeoisies and indigenous or ‘national’ bourgeoisies in post-colonial societies, a double reorientation of alignments has occurred. The erstwhile ‘comprador’ class demands restrictions on foreign businesses as they can’t compete with larger overseas concerns. Simultaneously, the growing ‘national’ bourgeoisie seeks access to advanced industrial technology and collaborates with developed metropolitan countries or socialist states. Despite potential limitations in these collaborations, the ‘national’ bourgeoisie becomes increasingly dependent on neo-colonialist metropolitan bourgeoisies as it expands its interests and size.
UNEQUAL COLLABORATION
In post-colonial societies, the relationship between the native bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisies is collaborative, but unequal and hierarchical. The native bourgeoisie assumes a subordinate, client status in this relationship, providing a channel for the metropolitan bourgeoisie to pursue their economic interests without direct political risks. Agreements with the native bourgeoisie establish captive markets for their products and technologies.
Despite their close collaboration, the two bourgeoisies are not merged into a single class. Their interests remain competitive, which necessitates the mediating role of the bureaucratic-military oligarchies. Positions in the oligarchy are crucial for aspiring educated middle-class groups, leading to political demands focused on gaining access to positions of influence and power within the oligarchy.
In post-colonial societies like Pakistan, political issues often revolve around sectional or regional interests due to the narrow social or regional base of the ruling bureaucratic-military oligarchy. The ruling oligarchy manipulates ideologies like ‘national solidarity’ to defend their particularistic privileges and denounce opposition movements as divisive.
The aspirations of Bengalis in Pakistan have led to a language movement and demands for equitable treatment and a fair share of economic resources for development in East Bengal. Over time, the movement has become more progressive and socialist ideas gained traction, further highlighting the tensions and complexities in the post-colonial society’s political landscape.
CREATING A BENGALI BOURGEOISIE
President Ayub aimed to create a Bengali bourgeoisie in the 1960s, supported by the Pakistani bourgeoisie, to counter socialist ideas and gain a political base in East Bengal. Two groups emerged: the ‘contactors’ with bureaucratic connections, profiting from permits and licenses, and the ‘contractors’ who received inflated construction contracts. The ‘contactors’ showed ambivalence towards Bengali nationalism, benefiting from its pressure but also supporting right-wing movements. The movement for East Bengal’s independence was mainly driven by the petty bourgeoisie, including rich farmers aligned with the Awami League. The elitist leaders of the Awami League had mixed intentions, exploiting their radical base but also fearing its impact on their aspirations. Sheikh Mujib’s negotiation attempts for autonomy within Pakistan continued despite de facto control, leading to the demand for independence when Pakistan responded with terror.
THE MAKING OF BANGLADESH
Since the creation of Bangladesh, a confrontation has emerged between the elitist element in the Awami League and its populist bases. The populist and Marxist political cadres, once isolated, gained strength during their armed liberation struggle and established a new relationship with the people. The Pakistani army faced a crisis due to a weak economy in West Pakistan, creating opportunities for the liberation forces in Bengal. India intervened at this moment to prevent the popular forces from achieving liberation and instead install the Awami League elitist leadership in power.
Today, the situation in Bangladesh differs significantly from Pakistan’s independence in 1947. The Awami League regime aligns with the Bengali bureaucracy and privileged groups but lacks substantial military backing. The populist forces have undergone armed struggle and developed organizationally, possessing significant quantities of arms. Sheikh Mujib attempts to persuade these forces to hand over their arms or integrate into Bangladesh’s organized military, but with little success. The future holds possibilities for either a new bureaucratic-military oligarchy to consolidate power or Bangladesh being plunged into an armed revolutionary struggle due to weak coercive state power and deep economic crises.
